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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UCA § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the Ogden City Code for the Abatement of Dangerous 
Buildings, Chapter 8, Title 16 is a "zoning ordinance" subject to the special 
notice requirements of UCA §§ 10-9-402 to -403. This is a question of 
statutory interpretation that the Court reviews for correctness without deference 
to the conclusions of the district court. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 
759 (Utah 1990). 
2. Whether compliance with the registration requirements of the 
Ogden City Code, Chapter 8B, Title 16, Sections 3 and 5, was conditioned on 
compliance with the signage requirements, Section 9. This is a question of 
statutory interpretation that the Court reviews for correctness without deference 
to the conclusions of the district court. Ward v. Richfield City, supra. 
3. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the legal 
conclusion that defendant's buildings were "vacant" by definition of the Code. 
In criminal bench trials, the judgment of conviction must be sustained unless it 
is against the clear weight of the evidence. State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 
786 (Utah 1988). 
l 
4. Whether defendant could lawfully be charged on the dates in 
question (January 1-12, 2002). This is a question of statutory interpretation that 
the Court reviews for correctness without deference to the conclusions of the 
district court. Ward v. Richfield City, supra. 
5. Whether the Ogden City Code violates UCA § 10-9-408. This is a 
question of statutory interpretation that the Court reviews for correctness 
without deference to the conclusions of the district court. Ward v. Richfield 
City, supra. 
6. Whether any of defendant's remaining points (V, VII, VIII) were 
raised in the court below. State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 324, 350 (Utah 2000). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This appeal is from two criminal cases, one for each building owned 
and/or controlled by defendant. In Case No. 021900315, defendant was 
charged with two violations of Section 16-8B-9(J) of the Ogden City Code for 
the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. (R. 001) In Case No. 021900420, 
defendant was charged with one violation of Section 16-8B-3 and one violation 
of the same Section 16-8B-9(J). (R. 001) 
On March 5, 2002, the City filed an Amended Information in Case No. 
021900315, adding two new charges that mirrored those in Case No. 
021900420: One, for violation of Section 16-8B-3; and another for violation of 
Section 16-8B-9(J). (R. 006) On October 2, 2002, the Informations in both 
cases were amended again. (RR. 017-18, 018-19) This time, all charges were 
reduced to infractions. In addition, there was added a new charge for violation 
of Section 16-8B-5. 
Most importantly, the four charges were separated into two sets. The 
ones concerning Section 16-8B-9 were separated into the one set. (RR. 017, 
018)1 This was done because in a separate, civil action (Case No. 020900777), 
defendant challenged the constitutionality of Section 16-8B-9. In fact, this was 
the subject of Motions to Stay filed by defendant at the beginning of the cases. 
(RR. 008, 006) 
The cases came on for trial on August 16, 2002. However, the Minutes 
show that the trial was not held. (R. 012, 008) The City informed the court 
about the pending civil action concerning the constitutionality of Counts I and 
IL As a result, those Counts were set for disposition on October 17, 2002. The 
remaining Counts were set for trial on that same date. 
1
 For some reason, they were mislabeled "Section 16-8B-10." 
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By the time the cases came on for trial, the civil action had not been 
decided. Therefore, the trial was "bifurcated" and defendant went to trial on the 
two remaining charges and was convicted in both cases. (RR. 023-24, 015-016) 
Defendant took an immediate appeal from the judgments of conviction. 
(RR. 028, 020) However, there had been no disposition of Counts I and II. 
Defendant's appeal from the judgment of conviction in Case No. 021900315 
was dismissed for failure to file a docketing statement. (R. 045) Defendant's 
appeal from the judgment of conviction in Case No. 021900420 was dismissed 
for lack of finality. (RR. 060-061) 
After the cases were remitted, the civil action resulted in a determination 
by the district court that Section 16-8B-9(G) of the Code was unconstitutional.2 
However, the district court determined that Subsection (G) was severable, and 
therefore, left "the remainder of Article 16-8B intact." The City did not appeal 
the district court's Memorandum Decision. 
Shortly after the Memorandum Decision, defendant filed a Motion to 
Dismiss and Vacate all charges, including those that were not the subject of the 
Memorandum Decision. (RR. 055, 080) The Motion was based on the 
2
 Appellant's Addendum 9. The Memorandum Decision makes reference to "Ogden Municipal Code § 16-8B-
10(G)." However, it is understood to have meant the same Section 16-8B-9(G) that is at issue in this case. 
Memorandum Decision, but, more particularly, on the argument raised, for the 
first time, that the Ogden City Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings 
was a "zoning ordinance," subject to the special notice provisions of the 
Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act, UCA § 10-9-101, et 
seq. 
Following hearing, the district court granted the Motion to Dismiss, but 
denied the Motion to Vacate. (RR. 098, 089) Specifically, the district court 
dismissed Counts I and II (even though Count II was under non-offending Code 
Subsection (J)), and denied the Motion to Vacate Counts III and IV. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Ogden City Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings 
is not a "zoning ordinance." It was enacted pursuant to the City's "general 
powers," specifically, "to protect the public health, safety and welfare by 
establishing a registration process for vacant buildings and requiring 
responsible parties to implement a vacant building plan for such buildings to 
remedy any public nuisance, prevent deterioration, unsightly blight and 
consequent adverse impact on the value of nearby property,...." UCA §§ 10-8-
1, et seq. As a result, the City was not required to follow the special notice 
provisions of the Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act, 
UCA§§ 10-9-101, etseq. 
2. Defendant was not required to remove his signs as a condition of 
complying with the registration requirements of the Code. Defendant points to 
the City's letter of January 9, 2002 (Appellant's Addendum 3), but it states no 
such thing. It plainly states that the covered windows and "unlawful signs" 
were a separate, but different violation of the Code. It is obvious from the 
construction of the Code that defendant could have complied with the 
registration requirements of the Code without waiving his constitutional 
objections to the signage requirements. 
3. The judgments of conviction were not against the clear weight of 
the evidence. Defendant acquired an interest in the properties some 6-7 years 
before the criminal charges, but at the time of the criminal charges, all he did 
was store some personal property and operate a part-time office on the 
properties. He admitted that at one point, he planned to construct a "bed and 
breakfast" and a restaurant, which would have been in keeping with the design 
and historical usage of the properties. However, he also admitted that he had 
abandoned those plans long before. Even though construction materials and 
equipment were kept on the premises, he was not actively remodeling the 
properties. He did not have a certificate of occupancy for either property, and 
he did not have a license to operate any business on the properties. They were 
undeniably business properties. Therefore, in the language of the Code, they 
were not used "on a regular basis for the usual and customary purposes for 
which a building is designed and lawfully permitted." 
4. Defendant was charged with having failed to register his buildings. 
Section 16-8B-3. Defendant was required to register his buildings because they 
had remained vacant for more than ninety (90) days. Section 16-8B-3A. Under 
the Code, the City was required to notify defendant of the registration 
requirement. Section 16-8B-3C. Notice had to be by personal delivery or first-
class mail deposit. The City mailed the notices on January 9,2002. Defendant 
had ten (10) days within which to register his buildings. Section 16-8B-3A. 
The criminal Informations were filed on January 23, 2002, which was more 
than ten (10) days from the date of notice. Defendant was guilty of the offense 
and could have been charged on any of the days preceding the criminal 
Informations so long as they were outside the ninety (90) day time frame. 
5. The Ogden City Code is not a "zoning ordinance." Therefore, 
UCA § 10-9-408 is inapplicable. 
6. Defendant did not raise any of his remaining Points (Five, Seven 
and Eight) in the court below. They cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OGDEN CITY CODE FOR THE ABATEMENT OF 
DANGEROUS BUILDINGS IS NOT A "ZONING ORDINANCE." 
THEREFORE, THE SPECIAL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE MUNICIPAL LAND USE DEVELOPMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT ACT DO NOT APPLY. 
The Ogden City Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings has 
nothing to do with "zoning." This may be seen from the most cursory 
examination of its contents (Appellant's Addendum 1). It was enacted to make 
"extensive revisions to the [already existing] Ogden City Code for the 
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, ...." Most particularly, it repealed existing 
"Article B, concerning temporary boarding of buildings and temporary 
boarding permits,...." The new Article B required "the registration of vacant 
buildings and the submission and approval of a vacant building plan,...." It 
also adopted "standards for the maintenance of vacant buildings, and imposing 
additional fee [sic] for reregistration when the owner does not comply with the 
plan and for each month that a vacant buildings is boarded; ...." 
Perhaps most telling is the fact that Article B of the Code "shall apply to 
all vacant buildings or structures within the City now existing or hereafter 
becoming vacant." 16-8B-1. The purpose and intent of the Article was "to 
protect the public health, safety, and welfare by establishing a registration 
process for vacant buildings and requiring responsible parties to implement a 
vacant building plan for such buildings to remedy any public nuisance, prevent 
deterioration, unsightly blight and consequent adverse impact on the value of 
nearby property, and to establish minimum maintenance standards for vacant 
buildings." 16-8B-2. Article B is a tailor-made exercise of the City's "general 
powers." 
Those powers are listed in UCA, Title 10, Chapter 8. Among them are 
the following: 
They [cities] may define fire limits and prescribe limits within 
which no building shall be constructed except of brick, stone or other 
incombustible material, without permission, and may cause the 
destruction or removal of any building constructed or repaired in 
violation of any ordinance, and cause all buildings and enclosures which 
may be in a dangerous state to be put in a safe condition or removed. 
UCA§ 10-8-52. 
They may prescribe the manner of constructing stone, brick and 
other buildings, and the construction and maintenance of fire escapes; 
may cause all buildings used for public purposes to be provided with 
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sufficient and ample means of exit and entrance, and to be supplied with 
necessary and appropriate appliances for the extinguishment of fire; may 
prevent the overcrowding thereof, and regulate the placing and use of 
seats, scenery, curtains, blinds, screens, or other appliances therein. 
UCA§ 10-8-53. 
They may prevent the dangerous construction and condition of 
chimneys, fireplaces, stoves, stovepipes, heaters, ovens, fizmaces, boilers, 
and apparatus used in and about buildings and manufactories, and cause 
the same to be removed or placed in a safe condition; and may regulate 
and prevent the carrying on or manufacturing likely to cause fire, and 
may prevent he deposit of ashes in unsafe places. 
UCA§ 10-8-54. 
More to the point, the amendments to the Code were enacted "to remedy 
any public nuisance, prevent deterioration, unsightly blight and consequent 
adverse impact on the value of nearby property." These are the subjects of 
other Sections within Article 1: 
They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, 
and impose fines upon persons who may create, continue or suffer 
nuisances to exist. 
UCA§ 10-8-60. 
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, 
not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all 
powers and duties conferred by this chapter [8], and as are necessary and 
proper to provide for the safety and preserve the health, and promote the 
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, and 
convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the protection of 
property in the city; and may enforce obedience to the ordinances with 
fines or penalties as they may deem proper,.... 
UCA § 10-8-84. 
The City's "zoning" powers (UCA § 10-9-401, et seq.) were set out from 
its "general" powers. They are contained within the Municipal Land Use 
Development and Management Act, UCA § 10-9-101, et seq., which has no 
part of Article 1, Chapter 8. The stated purpose of the Act is plain enough: 
To accomplish the purpose of this chapter, and in order to provide 
for the health, safety, and welfare, and promote the prosperity, improve 
the morals, peace and good order, comfort, convenience, and aesthetics 
of the municipality and its present and future inhabitants and businesses, 
to protect the tax base, secure economy in governmental expenditures, 
foster the state's agricultural and other industries, protect both urban and 
nonurban development, and to protect property values, municipalities 
may enact all ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider 
necessary for the use and development of land within the municipality, 
including ordinances, resolutions, and rules governing uses, density, open 
spaces, structures, buildings, energy efficiency, light and air, air quality, 
transportation and public or alternative transportation, infrastructure, 
public facilities, vegetation, and trees and landscaping, .... 
UCA § 10-9-102. 
"Zoning" is a major part of the Act: 
u 
The legislative body may enact a zoning ordinance establishing 
regulations for land use and development that furthers the intent of this 
chapter. 
UCA§ 10-9-401. 
The Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings does not purport to 
regulate the "use" to which defendant's buildings could be put. It does not 
purport to regulate how they can be "developed." It addresses the very specific 
concern of "public nuisance," which finds itself expressed as one of the City's 
general powers. There is perhaps no better way of saying that the Code is not a 
"zoning ordinance." 
Of course, there are notice requirements for the adoption of general 
power ordinances. However, there is no contention that the City failed to 
comply with those requirements. For example, defendant concedes (pg. 10) 
that the Code was enacted at a public meeting, UCA § 52-4-3, for which there 
had been publication and posting. UCA § 10-3-711. The City followed every 
procedural requirement applicable to this case. 
n. DEFENDANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO WAIVE HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTION TO SECTION 9 OF THE 
CODE. HE COULD HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE 
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE CODE WITHOUT 
WAIVING HIS CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTION TO THE 
SIGNAGE REQUIREMENTS. 
Defendant states his point in the first sentence (pp. 30-31): "As a 
condition of the letter of January 9, 2002, to register [defendant's] properties as 
vacant, [defendant] was required to comply with Ogden City Maintenance 
Standard [sic] and remove the 'unlawful signs' on [defendant's] property, ...." 
The letter (Appellant's Addendum 3) says no such thing. 
The second paragraph of the letter: "As the building official of Ogden 
City, I have determined that the building,... is a vacant building subject to the 
requirements of the ordinance. As the owner of that building you are required 
to register the building within ten days of this notification, and otherwise begin 
to comply with the requirements of the ordinance." 
The third paragraph explained the "registration" process. It explained 
that registration required "submission of a vacant building plan, meeting the 
requirements of Section 16-8B-5, and a registration fee in the amount of 
$100.00,...." Additionally, it stated that additional fees would be applicable to 
13 
vacant buildings that remained "boarded." Finally, it stated that re-registration 
and additional fees would be required every six months depending on 
compliance with the vacant building plan and whether the building remained 
boarded. 
However, there was no mention of the "signage" requirements of Section 
9. That is because the signage requirements had nothing to do with the 
registration requirements of the Code. 
Registration is required under Section 16-8B-3 of the Code, and is the 
subject of 16-8B-4 (Appellant's Addendum 1). There are several registration 
requirements, one of which is the submission of a "vacant building plan," which 
is the subject of 16-8B-5. Additionally, there are the "mitigation fees" 
referenced in the City's letter, which are the subject of 16-8B-8. However, 
there is no mention of the signage requirements of Section 9. 
Those appear in the "Maintenance Standards" referenced in defendant's 
brief, which are the subject of 16-8B-9. They include boarding (9A); the 
securing of exterior doors (9B); landscaping and lawns (9C); the surfacing of 
exterior walls (9D); snow removal (9E); and utility connections (9F). They also 
include signage (9G); and obscuring of windows (9J), which were the subjects 
of the criminal Informations. 
However, their violation is mentioned separately in the City's letter: 
"You should also be aware that we have identified the following violation(s) of 
the maintenance standards, which should be corrected immediately: 1. The 
windows and glass exterior doors on the building are painted or otherwise 
obscured... 2. Unlawful signs visible from adjacent public street [sic], sidewalk 
or adjacent properties are displayed in the windows of the building, ...." 
The letter ended with the following statement: "My staff and I are eager 
to assist you with the registration process and in preparing the vacant building 
plan. We are also available to discuss any questions you may have about the 
maintenance standards and the other requirements of the ordinance." From this, 
it is obvious that defendant could have complied with the registration 
requirements while preserving his constitutional objections to the maintenance 
standards. 
The constitutionality of Section 9(J) is not the subject of this appeal. As 
a result, defendant's contention about a "prior restraint" has no place in this 
appeal. The case would be different if defendant had been required to waive his 
constitutional objection to Subsection 9(J) in order to comply with the 
registration requirements of the Code. However, it is obvious that waiver was 
not required. 
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III. THE JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION WERE NOT AGAINST 
THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. THE 
PROPERTIES WERE NOT BEING USED "ON A REGULAR 
BASIS FOR THE USUAL AND CUSTOMARY PURPOSES FOR 
WHICH A BUILDING IS DESIGNED AND LAWFULLY 
PERMITTED." 
At the trial of the actions, defendant testified that he acquired his interest 
in the properties some 6-7 years before. (TR 72/17-19) Both were historic 
buildings; one had been built as a bar, and the other as a hotel. (TR 48/8-23, 
49/4-10) Defendant admitted that at some time point, his plan had been to 
convert the properties to a restaurant and a bed and breakfast, respectively. (TR 
73/10-13) There is no question that such a plan would have been perfectly 
consistent with the properties' design and historical use. 
Defendant testified that at some time during that 6-7 years, he had started 
the renovation work. (TR 76/11-25, 77/1-5, 6-14) In fact, during the times 
alleged, there were to be seen construction equipment and materials. (TR 16/1-
17) However, defendant admitted that prior to the time of the criminal charges, 
work had stopped: "There has been no construction going on in the building for 
some time." (TR 77/12-16, 78/2-3) 
Significantly, defendant admitted that the use to which tie was putting the 
property was not the use for which the properties were designed. (TR 91/1-9) 
Defendant admitted that during the time in question, he had not put the 
properties to any "commercial activity." (TR 88/4-11) As a result, defendant 
had no business license (TR 89/2-5), and he had no certificate of occupancy for 
either of the buildings. (TR 99/12-16) 
Defendant's entire case was built on the fact that during the times in 
question, he stored personal property and had an office in one of the buildings. 
(TR 49/11-25, 50/1-17, 55/19-25, 56/1-15) The City's Manager of Building 
Services testified that property storage was not a permitted use in the Central 
Business District. (TR 95/21-25, 96/1-14) 
Section 16-8A-3 defined "vacant" as: "(A) Empty; (B) Not occupied on 
a regular basis by an occupant; or (C) Not used by a person on a regular basis 
for the usual and customary purposes for which a building is designed and 
lawfully permitted." The first two points are arguable, but the third is not: The 
property was not designed or lawfully permitted for personal storage. It was 
designed and lawfully permitted for a bar and a hotel. There was simply no 
evidence to the contrary. 
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IV. DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF THE CHARGES ON THE 
DATES IN QUESTION. HE NEVER REGISTERED THE 
PROPERTY, AND HE WAS GIVEN MORE THAN TEN (10) 
DAYS' NOTICE OF THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS. 
Defendant was charged with having failed to register his buildings. 
Section 16-8B-3. Defendant was required to register his buildings because they 
had remained vacant for more than ninety (90) days. Section 16-8B-3A. 
Under the Code, the City was required to notify defendant of the 
registration requirement. Section 16-8B-3C. Notice had to be by personal 
delivery or first-class mail deposit. The City mailed the notices on January 9, 
2002. Defendant had ten (10) days within which to register his buildings. 
Section 16-8B-3A. 
The criminal Informations were filed on January 23, 2002, which was 
more than ten (10) days from the date of notice. Defendant was guilty of the 
offense and could have been charged on any of the days preceding the criminal 
Informations so long as they were outside the ninety (90) day time frame. 
V. UCA § 10-9-408 IS INAPPLICABLE BECAUSE THE OGDEN 
CITY CODE IS NOT A "ZONING ORDINANCE." 
UCA § 10-9-408 is inapplicable because the Ogden City Code is not a 
"zoning ordinance." The same argument appears above (Section I). 
VI. DEFENDAlNfT FAILED TO RAISE HIS REMAINING POINTS IN 
THE COURT BELOW. 
It is well-settled that "claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 324, 350 (Utah 2000). To preserve 
an issue for appeal, defendant "must enter an objection on the record that is 
both timely and specific." State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah App. 1993). 
A careful search of the record in this case shows that defendant never 
raised the following points in his brief: Five, Seven and Eight. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the City respectfully requests that the Court 
affirm the judgments of conviction in this case. 
No addendum is necessary under URAP 24(a)(l 1). 
DATED this l i l ciay of August, 2004. 
DALTON & KELLEY 
^AM^^^W— By 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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